Motivated by the US Fiscal Cli¤ in 2012, this paper considers the short-and longerterm impact of uncertainty generated by …scal policy. Empirical evidence shows increases in economic policy uncertainty lower investment and employment. Investment that is longer-lived and subject to a longer planning horizon responds to policy uncertainty with a lag, while capital that depreciates more quickly and can be installed with few costs falls immediately. A DSGE model incorporating uncertainty over future tax regimes produces responses to …scal uncertainty that match key features of the data.
Introduction
Fiscal uncertainty arises in many forms. Expiring temporary stimulus measures, projections of rapid debt growth, and oscillating political concerns over general levels of taxation all contribute to …scal uncertainty. In the US, a particularly stark example occurred in the summer of 2011 as the US federal government approached its statutory borrowing limit. A default on US debt was avoided, but only due to a temporary compromise to impose …scal restraint in the future. The restraint, however, was set to take e¤ect at the same time that a package of earlier tax cuts were set to expire. The con ‡uence of the various policies all were set to take e¤ect starting in 2013, resulting in the so-called "Fiscal Cli¤" that was a common topic among policymakers and the public throughout much of 2012. Looking ahead in the US, longer-term projections of rapid debt growth also raise questions about future …scal policy.
Although aspects of …scal uncertainty vary in particular details, such uncertainty has a two unique features. First, …scal uncertainty often revolves around the potential for a speci…c set of changes to the average tax rate or level of government spending. Rather than a mean-preserving spread over a continuum of possible changes, episodes such as the Fiscal Cli¤ generally involve two possible outcomes: the passing of legislation to avoid the Cli¤ and thereby maintain the current structure of …scal policy, or hit the Cli¤ and adjust towards the well-de…ned alternative. The discrete nature of possible policy changes are often not mean preserving, which eliminates many outcomes that could occur if changes in policy were instead viewed as a mean-preserving over a continuum of outcomes.
A second particular aspect of …scal uncertainty is that …scal reforms often have speci…c dates in the future that serve as decision points. In the recent US Fiscal Cli¤ episode, the end of 2012 served as the critical date when Congress would either pass legislation preserving the structure of …scal policy, or a wide range of previous laws would expire leading to a major …scal policy shift. In the lead-up to the decision date, a high degree of uncertainty about future policy prevails, but uncertainty is forced to be resolved at the decision point. This paper studies the e¤ects of uncertainty generated by expiring taxes, such as that associated with the Fiscal Cli¤ in the US. It empirically documents that uncertainty about economic policy causes declines in employment and investment, although the exact nature of the investment decline varies by the type of capital. The paper then presents a model that captures the two important features of …scal uncertainty: a set of possible future tax regimes and a speci…c future resolution date. The model generates responses to uncertainty that match key features of the data, such as a slow-down in employment and investment leading up to the decision point, as well as dynamics after uncertainty is resolved. Finally, the framework gives agents in the economy rational expectations over how the uncertainty may be resolved, so the paper studies how di¤erent expectation structures a¤ect outcomes.
A large number of papers study the economic e¤ects of uncertainty about the future. Bloom (2009) shows that after an increase in uncertainty, …rms pause in their hiring and investing, with an overshooting response in the future. Basu and Bundick (2012) , Bloom et al. (2012) , and Leduc and Liu (2012) argue that uncertainty shocks are important drivers of ‡uctuations, Christiano et al. (2014) show how uncertainty can interact with …nancial frictions, and Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011) show that higher volatility has large impacts in emerging economies.
Fiscal uncertainty represents a speci…c source of uncertainty included in general uncertainty about economic policy. Baker et al. (2013) develop an economic policy uncertainty index and show that increases in policy uncertainty lower investment and employment. Figure 1 shows the Fiscal Cli¤ period-shown by the dotted line-generated one of the highest readings for the policy uncertainty index, exceeded only by the combination of the debt ceiling dispute and the Euro debt crisis. This paper adds to the literature on the e¤ects of uncertainty by empirically documenting that increases in policy uncertainty generate di¤er-ent responses in investment according to the type of capital.
Rather than a consideration of general policy uncertainty, which includes uncertainty about in ‡ation and spending, this paper focuses on uncertainty generated by expiring tax episodes similar to that studied in this paper may be increasingly important in the future.
In addition, the results in this paper imply the use of automatic sunset provisions, which have legislation expire after a certain number of years in an attempt to prevent outdated laws from persisting, may have the unintended consequence of adding uncertainty.
Expiring provisions have two possible outcomes-either Congress extends the provisions or lets them expire-and a speci…c future date as a decision point-the end of the year. As a result, de…ning uncertainty as a mean-preserving spread in tax processes that dissipates over time may not capture some …rst-order implications of uncertainty generated by episodes similar to the Fiscal Cli¤. For example, Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2012) estimate sto-chastic volatility processes for taxes and spending and show that inserting this process into a New Keynesian model produces adverse e¤ects on economic activity. These stochastic volatility processes, however, imply symmetric distributions for the realizations of future shocks-implying that taxes and spending may increase or decrease-while this paper assumes that the tax policy may stay the same or it may adjust to a speci…c alternative. In addition, uncertainty never gets resolved under stochastic volatility. Instead, the processes governing …scal policy gradually return to their normal volatility, whereas the model in this paper considers uncertainty that has a resolution date.
The model in this paper assumes rational expectations, which implies that household and …rms understand current …scal policy as well as possible changes in the future. In this setting, an uncertainty shock implies the arrival of new information that policy may change in the future. Other papers, such as Davig (2004), Hollmayr and Matthes (2013) or Richter and Throckmorton (2013) , assume agents in the economy learn about the …scal policy rule in place, and uncertainty increases the volatility in the economy. In this setup, the economy doesn't face an uncertainty shock, but simply has changes in policies that agents must learn.
A …scal uncertainty shock associated with a future resolution date resembles a news shock.
Rather than a perfectly known change, as in Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) , or a noisy signal, as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012) and Born et al. (2013) , a …scal uncertainty shock can be interpreted as information about a change in the policy rule in the future that may or may not be realized.
Finally, a large body of research studies the fact that uncertainty over discrete changes in future …scal policy a¤ect the economy in the short term. For example, Chung et al. (2007) , Davig and Leeper (2011), Bianchi (2012) , and Bianchi and Melosi (2013) all note that the potential for switches in the …scal policy rule matter for how the economy responds to shocks.
However, these papers do not have a well-de…ned concept of an uncertainty shock, which this paper introduces to this literature.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents empirical evidence on the e¤ects of policy uncertainty. Based upon this evidence, Section 3 discusses a model that captures the main features of the Fiscal Cli¤. Using this model, Section 4 shows the impact of …scal uncertainty. Section 5 highlights how expectations interact with uncertainty, and Section 6 concludes.
Empirical Evidence
Before turning to the theoretical model, this section considers the e¤ects of economic policy uncertainty on activity. To accomplish this goal, consider a vector-autoregression (VAR) model using the economic policy uncertainty (EPU) index in Baker et al. (2013) . The e¤ects of uncertainty in this framework are captured by how investment and employment respond to an identi…ed shock to the EPU index. The benchmark VAR contains the EPU index, private employment from the Current Establishment Survey, and real investment in structures and equipment from the National Income and Product Accounts. The EPU index is in levels, while the investment and employment are in quarter-over-quarter, annualized percentage changes. The VAR has four lags. The sample is at a quarterly frequency and runs from 1986 Q1 to 2013 Q3.
The structural shocks are identi…ed using a Cholesky decomposition with the EPU index ordered …rst. The ordering implies that the EPU index does not respond contemporaneously to macroeconomic developments, but that investment and employment growth can change on impact to an EPU shock. Figure 2 shows the impulse responses to an identi…ed two standard deviation shock to the EPU index. In response to the shock, both investment and employment growth decline over several quarters. Private-nonresidential investment growth falls by about 2 percentage points at an annualized rate for 5 quarters. Private employment growth declines as well, falling by over 0.5 percentage points at the trough.
The immediate decline in investment growth shown in Figure 2 masks some of the effects of an EPU shock. For example, certain types of investment may respond quickly to The results demonstrate that employment and investment both decline in response to an increase in economic policy uncertainty, as measured by the EPU index. Importantly, investment in structures responds with a lag, suggesting that possible adjustment frictions and a lower depreciation rate lead …rms to not reduce investment immediately after a shock.
On the other hand, investment in new equipment shows an immediate decline, since it is not subject to the same adjustment frictions and tends to depreciate faster. The next section presents a model that captures these features of the data.
Model Overview
This section describes the model, including the representative household, the representative …rm, and …scal policy, followed by a discussion of the evolution of uncertainty, how to quantify …scal uncertainty, and the parameterization.
Households
The representative household has preferences over consumption C t and labor L t as in Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009), restricted to the case of King et al. (1988) preferences. That is, it max-
where 2 (0; 1) denotes the discount factor, > 0 the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, > 0 the disutility of labor, and > 1 controls the elasticity of labor supply.
Given evidence in Section 2 that the response of investment in equipment di¤ers compared to structures following a policy uncertainty shock, the model has two capital types, denoted K 1;t and K 2;t . Households choose consumption C t , labor L t , investment in the two capital types I 1;t and I 2;t , and purchase bonds B t to maximize (1) subject to the budget constraint
where U 1;t and U 2;t denote the real rental rate on the two capital types, W t denotes the real wage rate, R t 1 the real return on bonds, and t the time-varying distortionary tax rate on income.
Each type of capital is subject to its own accumulation equation, with distinct adjustment costs and depreciation rates. The …rst type of capital is subject to adjustment costs in the change in investment, so capital accumulation follows
where 1 denotes the rate of depreciation and ' the degree of adjustment costs. The second capital type has no adjustment cost and accumulates according to
where 2 denotes the depreciation rate. In this setup, capital type K 1;t responds more sluggishly than K 2;t to investment depending on the adjustment cost parameter '. These processes interpret K 1;t as structures and K 2;t as equipment.
Firms
The perfectly competitive, representative …rm produces output Y t using the Cobb-Douglas production technology
where 1 and 2 denote the respective capital shares. The …rm makes production decisions by solving a series of one-period problems, maximizing pro…ts and taking the rental rates U 1;t and U 2;t , and the wage rate W t as given. Assuming an interior solution, …rms maximize pro…ts by equating marginal products with factor prices.
Fiscal Policy
To focus analysis on the e¤ects of changes in the tax rate, government spending is constant G t = G = gY ss for all t, where g denotes the fraction of steady state output Y ss . Given this restriction, debt evolves according to
where the government must pay the real rate of return of R t 1 on outstanding bonds. In equilibrium, the quantity of bonds willingly held be the representative agent, B t , must equal the aggregate level of government debt.
All uncertainty is associated with the income tax rate, which follows the debt feedback
where the error " t follows an auto-regressive process
with u t N (0; 1) and E [u t u s ] = 0 for s 6 = t: Innovations in u t represent intra-regime shocks and changes in S t represent regime shifts. The intercept in (7) governs the regime-dependent average level of taxation and debt, and takes one of two values
The next subsection discusses how (S t ) evolves over time.
Given there is no long-run growth and the real interest rate is positive, the transversality condition holds if debt does not grow faster than the real interest rate. To satisfy this condition, parameters in the tax rule must generate su¢ cient tax revenue to stabilize the debt-to-output ratio in each regime. In linearized versions of this model, the condition requires > 1= .
The debt feedback in the tax rule (7) generates an inverse relationship between the intercept term (S t ) and the level of taxes in the long run. In steady state, larger values of (S t ) are associated with lower debt levels, which produces lower income tax rates. Higher average tax rates can support higher interest costs, so a high average tax rate implies higher debt. When (S t ) changes from a low value to a higher one, tax rates can move temporarily higher as debt is paid down. Eventually, as debt declines, lower tax rates follow as the economy transitions to a state with less debt. Figure 4 illustrates the ‡ow of information and how uncertainty is resolved. In S t = 0, households place probability p on receiving information in each period, which constitutes a …scal uncertainty shock. This shock signals a new tax regime may be in place after N periods. Absent a shock, households understand in this regime that a future adjustment in the tax rate is possible, but view the timing as uncertain. In addition, given a low probability of an uncertainty shock p, the S t = 0 regime re ‡ects the status quo.
Information Structure
With probability p each period, the economy receives an uncertainty shock that moves it from S t = 0 to S t = 1. This regime change has the ‡avor of a news shock, as no fundamental policy parameters actually change. The shift, however, provides households with a clear calendar regarding the timing of a possible adjustment to tax rates. If a …scal uncertainty shock is realized, households anticipate after N periods the …scal authority will keep the existing tax rate governed by 0 with probability 1 q, and adjust to 1 with probability q.
Since households understand tax rates could change after the N period horizon, they begin adjusting their behavior immediately in response to the …scal uncertainty shock, which is upon the realization of S t = 1. In the baseline scenario N = 4, so uncertainty about the future tax regime lasts for four quarters.
A Markov-switching framework captures the timing and resolution of uncertainty within this information structure. In total, there are N + 3 regimes, where S t 2 f0; 1; :::; N + 2g
indicates the regime. For the case of N = 4, the transition matrix is Many of the income tax provisions were ultimately extended at the end of 2012, but not without substantial uncertainty leading up to the outcome.
More broadly, as countries face debt projections that grow as a share of GDP, such as the US, households are likely to anticipate an adjustment to tax rates at some point in the future, though are uncertain about the timing. In this case, households form expectations as if in a regime resembling S t = 0. As debt rises, however, policymakers will eventually focus on reforms to stabilize debt, either due to market or political pressures, and the timing of an adjustment becomes clearer to households. E¤orts to begin stabilizing debt, however, still require time to negotiate and are plagued by the inherent uncertainty associated with moving reforms through legislative channels.
The information ‡ow in Figure 4 is intended to capture these elements, consisting of a status quo regime, where households understand …scal reforms are possible, but the timing is uncertain and likely far into the future. The framework than also captures the impact of the arrival of news, such as a temporary tax extension or credible e¤orts by policymakers to begin negotiating reforms to stabilize debt, and the associated uncertainty as to how nearterm …scal issues may be resolved. The approach also captures transitional dynamics, due to a shift in fundamental …scal parameters, or a permanent extension of temporary …scal measures, such as a tax cut that was originally enacted to be temporary.
Measuring Fiscal Uncertainty
Given the information structure in Figure 4 and the income tax rule (7), there are two sources of …scal uncertainty: the intra-regime shock u t and the expiring tax provision process for (S t ). In order to assess …scal uncertainty in the economy, consider two measures: the value of income subject to expiring taxes, and the expected future tax burden.
The …rst, an expiring tax provision index, follows Baker et al. (2013) , and measures how much output is subject to expiring taxes. Since expiring taxes are only a near-term possibility between S t = 1 and S t = N , and otherwise the tax intercept is …xed in the near-term, the value of income subject to expiring tax provisions are de…ned as
( 1 0 ) Y t if S t 2 f1; : : : ; N g 0 if S t 2 f0; N + 1; N + 2g :
After an uncertainty shock, tax revenue equals ( 0 + B t 1 + " t ) Y t , while revenue under the alternate tax regime is ( 1 + B t 1 + " t ) Y t . The di¤erence is ( 1 0 ) Y t and indicates how much tax revenue would change if taxes expired. Note that, similar to standard estimates of the incidence of taxes such as that by the Congressional Budget O¢ ce, the measure ET P t does not take into account the general equilibrium e¤ects of taxes, since it uses a counterfactual tax rate without a corresponding counterfactual output level.
In addition to the expiring tax provision measure, to highlight longer-term implications of taxes, consider the expected present discounted value of all future tax revenue, which is given by
where t denotes the household's marginal utility of consumption at time t. This measure t captures the total future tax burden, appropriately discounted, that provides a measure of how expectations of future …scal policy change over time. Many of the parameters follow standard choices from the literature, but a few deserve special attention.
Parameter Values and Model Solution
Preferences follow Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009), which allow for varying degrees of the wealth e¤ect on labor supply between the case of no wealth e¤ect (Greenwood et al. (1988)) and a full wealth e¤ect that completely o¤sets the substitution e¤ect (King et al. (1988) ).
The preference speci…cation in (1) uses the latter, with a risk aversion of unity ( = 1), and Motivated by the VAR evidence in Section 2, the two types of capital re ‡ect key di¤er-ences between structures and equipment. Since structures responds more slowly to uncertainty shocks, K 1;t faces adjustment costs governed by ' = 2 as in Jaimovich and Rebelo The following results use the perturbation method for Markov-switching DSGE models of Foerster et al. (2013) , with a second-order approximation used to improve accuracy.
Intra-Regime Shock
Before discussing the impact of a …scal uncertainty shock, …rst consider the impact of a temporary shock to the tax rate, u t , without any uncertainty about future tax regimes. In this case, p = 0, so households expect 0 to govern the steady-state tax rate forever. Figure   5 illustrates the impact of a 0:1 percentage point increase in the tax rate. The increase has intuitive e¤ects, as both types of investment decline due to a lower expected after-tax rate of return. Investment in structures responds with a lag due to costly adjustment, while investment in equipment falls on impact. Employment also declines due to the lower aftertax real wage, which pulls output lower. The initial increase in the marginal tax rate causes debt to fall, which eventually leads to a lower tax rate and then to a recovery in output, consumption, investment, and employment as the shock dissipates. at some point in the future. As an example, this framework can capture a situation were a given average tax rate may have been scheduled to "sunset" at some point in the future, though households understand there is a possibility, perhaps for political reasons, that tax rates will actually be left unchanged. 1 As a practical example, consider the situation at the start of 2011. Congress passed in December of 2010 legislation that temporarily extended several tax provisions that were set to expire at the end of the year. The legislation also introduced additional temporary measure, such as a one-year reduction in the FICA payroll tax rate. The payroll tax cut, for example, was ultimately extended for one year, but then expired at the end of 2012 and contributed to the con ‡uence of …scal tightening measures scheduled to begin in 2013 commonly known as the Fiscal Cli¤.
The following results focus on two aspects: how the arrival of new information a¤ects the economy leading up to the period when uncertainty is resolved, as well as the response after resolution. If the average tax rate is ultimately left unchanged, then the …scal uncertainty shock amounts to noise that nonetheless temporarily induces changes to household decisions.
If the average tax rate does change, then households must complete the adjustment to the new steady state that only partially began upon the arrival of the initial information. Figure 6 illustrates the impact of a …scal uncertainty shock that ultimately does not result in a change to the tax policy rule. A shift to the regime where households know there is a possibility of tax rates moving higher in the future-after 4 periods in this case-generates an immediate decline in both types of investment and employment. Investment in structures drops with a lag due to costly adjustment, while investment in equipment falls sharply.
Fiscal Noise
Both types of investment decline due to expectations that the after-tax rate of return to capital may be lower in the future in the event that tax rates do ultimately move higher.
The allocation away from investment allows consumption to temporarily increase, similar to McGrattan (2012) .
The distorting e¤ects of future taxes induce households to consume more and provide less labor. The substitution e¤ect away from investment dominates the wealth e¤ect that would otherwise suggest lower consumption and more labor due to higher future taxes. In addition, a substitution e¤ect away from future labor to current labor in order to avoid taxation is overwhelmed by a desire to disinvest: households do not want to work more before taxes may increase because a lower investment incentive means that any further labor income would support already-high consumption.
The decline in labor supply causes output to decline in a similar manner. The loss in output leads to a lower tax base, which causes debt to rise and triggers an endogenous, though modest, increase in the tax rate. In this example, tax rates are ultimately held at 0 , but the spectre of higher taxes on capital income in the future causes households to substitute away from investment and labor and towards consumption and leisure. In period t = 5, tax rates do not adjust, indicating to households and …rms that the tax rate intercept will remain at 0 inde…nitely.
Upon the resolution of uncertainty, investment immediately increases, driven by a bounce back in equipment, while investment in structures has a more gradual rebound. The incentive to invest, now stronger because of an expectation that tax rates will remain lower in the future along with the need to o¤set the relative under-investment during the period of uncertainty, leads to a reallocation away from consumption towards investment starting in the period when the uncertainty is resolved. The reallocation back towards investment causes consumption to decline and labor to increase.
In terms of a rebound following the resolution of the uncertainty, any snap back in activity will be governed, in part, by the amount investment subject to adjustment costs. A heavy concentration of investment in structures, for example, will result in a gradual recovery. In contrast, equipment investment and employment show sharp recoveries starting in the period when uncertainty is resolved.
Full Fiscal Adjustment
Alternatively, policymakers may implement reforms after the N period horizon. In this case, Figure 7 illustrates how the economy responds to an uncertainty episode that is followed by a change in the tax regime relative to the case of …scal noise, where no …scal adjustment occurred. The di¤erences in the two paths begin in period …ve, which is the period when uncertainty is resolved.
The shift sets in motion household decisions to complete the adjustment that began when the uncertainty shock …rst hit. Equipment investment and employment drop sharply after the rule changes, structures adjust more gradually due to adjustment costs. Output also declines sharply, but not as fast as the drop in investment, so consumption temporarily rises re ‡ecting the desire to disinvest. Given the shift in policy, the tax rate increases causing a steady decline in debt. Eventually, debt falls su¢ ciently to endogenously pull the tax rate lower than prior to the …scal uncertainty episode and after a prolonged period, results in a higher capital stock and level of output.
Measuring a Fiscal Uncertainty Shock
Now consider what the …scal noise scenario in Figure 6 and the full …scal adjustment scenario in Figure 7 imply for the measures of …scal uncertainty described in Section 3.5. Figure 8 displays how the expiring tax provisions measure and the expected tax burden respond to the two scenarios.
When the …scal uncertainty shock hits, the expiring tax provisions measure increases and remains roughly constant for four periods. In Figure 6 , output is changing slightly in these periods, and so the expiring tax provisions measure changes slightly as well, but by an imperceptible amount. When uncertainty is resolved, the measure decreases back to zero, as there is no longer any chance of tax shifts in the future. In both scenarios, since the period between the uncertainty shock and the resolution are identical, so is the measure of expiring tax provisions.
The expected tax burden, however, does di¤er depending on the resolution of uncertainty.
The tax burden jumps when the …scal uncertainty shock …rst hits regardless of how it is resolved, but then rises sharply after N periods if tax rule changes and households complete the adjustment to the new …scal regime. In the …scal noise scenario, the tax burden measure falls after N periods in response to the unchanged tax policy, whereas the tax burden jumps in the scenario when the rule actually does shift. 
Expectations and the E¤ects of Uncertainty
Having presented the baseline results which consider the e¤ects of an uncertainty shock, now consider the interaction between expectations and uncertainty. Since households and …rms understand the probability of receiving an uncertainty shock p, the duration of the uncertainty episode N , and the probability that the tax rate adjusts q, changes in these parameters amount to altering expectations, and will in ‡uence economic outcomes before and after an uncertainty shock.
This section considers the e¤ects of these three di¤erent parameters on the model. The …rst section examines the e¤ects of expectations on the uncertainty episode by repeating the …scal noise scenario of Section 4.1 under di¤erent …scal adjustment probabilities q. The second section investigates the e¤ects of the duration of uncertainty in the …scal noise scenario by increasing N , which is the length between the uncertainty shock and the resolution. The third section analyzes how expectations of the likelihood of uncertainty shocks p a¤ects behavior and economic outcomes in the status quo regime S t = 0.
Fiscal Uncertainty and Expectations of Adjustment
Once the …scal uncertainty shock hits, the magnitude of the adjustment during the N period horizon depends primarily on the probability q that households attach to a shift in the tax rule. The baseline parameterize sets q = 0:25, so households only partially adjust to a potential change in the tax rule over the N period horizon. If q = 1:0, for example, then the uncertainty shock becomes a news shock, and households have complete knowledge about the future tax rule, so would begin fully incorporating higher taxes after N periods into their decisions.
Figure 9 compares dynamics across di¤erent values of q. The higher q, the greater households attached to the rule shifting after N periods. As q rises, the adjustment to an uncertainty shock is more heavily front loaded and therefore, the impact of the shock is larger. In contrast, if q is lower, households place a low probability on a future adjustment so only modestly adjust their behavior when the uncertainty shock hits. One aspect of the dynamics of interest is the extent of payback, or the rebound, if the tax rule ultimately does not change. In each case, labor rebounds modestly, but not enough to pull up output.
Instead, the lower capital stock weighs on output after uncertainty is resolved, so households reduce consumption to rebuild the capital stock. Stronger rebounds occur when the labor supply elasticity is higher or the share of capital subject to adjustment costs is reduced. Figure 10 shows how the two measures of …scal uncertainty change as q changes. The expiring tax provisions graphs are practically indistinguishable, so the value of income subject to expiring taxes does not change as q changes. Since Figure 9 highlights that changes in q do have signi…cant e¤ects on the impact of an uncertainty shock, the analysis suggests a caveat to the Baker et al. (2013) expiring tax provisions index shown in Figure 1 : the value of tax provisions is less important than the probability that adjustment takes place.
The expected tax burden plot in Figure 10 highlights how, when an uncertainty shock is realized, expected future taxes responds signi…cantly based upon the expectations of adjustment. With higher q households have a higher expected tax burden prior to the uncertainty shock, re ‡ecting their rational expectations about receiving an uncertainty shock and the probability of adjustment. When the shock is realized, higher q moves the expected tax burden a larger degree, since households expect adjustment. When adjustment doesn't occur, the tax burden falls signi…cantly. These changes in expected future taxes produce the large swings in investment seen in Figure 9 . 
Duration of Fiscal Uncertainty
The baseline results have …scal uncertainty episodes lasting for N = 4 periods, and during this time the economy experiences lower labor, investment, and output as it braces for a possible switch in the tax regime. In the baseline calibration, uncertainty lasts for a year, but one concern whether longer spells of uncertainty produce larger declines in economic activity, or if they simply produce a more drawn-out decline. Figure 11 compares the baseline case with one in which N = 8, so uncertainty lasts twice as long.
During the period of uncertainty, output, labor, and both investment types have similarly sized troughs and consumption has a similarly sized boom across the two durations. In the longer duration case, the economy experiences a longer decline. At the resolution date, the economies across the two speci…cations are at the same state, implying that households have an objective for their capital holdings and use the entire uncertainty episode as an adjustment period. When the tax rate ends up not adjusting, households build up investment and supply labor at a rate that is comparable regardless of the duration of uncertainty.
One potentially important di¤erence is that longer uncertainty spells lead to a larger buildup in debt, which produces slightly higher taxes even when …scal adjustment does not occur. This result implies that particularly lengthy uncertainty spells may lead to higher taxes for long periods of time, even in the case when the tax rule is …xed in the near term.
Long Run E¤ects of Fiscal Uncertainty
A more pernicious implication of …scal uncertainty arises from the impact on the distributions of variables before an uncertainty shock occurs. As households make decisions in the initial, or status-quo, regime (S t = 0), the probability of higher future taxes persistently weighs on the level of investment and capital stock. So while q was a key parameter in governing the transitional dynamics following a …scal uncertainty shock, p is more relevant in a¤ecting the stochastic steady-state levels conditional on the status-quo regime. One interpretation of the parameter p is that it conveys the general level of …scal uncertainty in the economy. If p is relatively high, households are more likely to face a …scal uncertainty shock that may result in higher taxes after N periods. As Figure 12 illustrates, the stochastic steady-state levels of investment, employment, consumption and output fall below steady state levels in economies with no uncertainty about future …scal regimes (i.e. p = 0).
The framework provides a clear mechanism for how post-recession …scal policy, which Figure 1 illustrates was often plagued by …scal uncertainty, as well as how longer-term …s-cal uncertainty may be weighing on both the current economic recovery and longer-term economic growth. For example, projections from the Congressional Budget O¢ ce raise ques-tions about the stability of debt dynamics over a multi-decade horizon. Such projections raise uncertainty regarding future taxes, which map into the parameter p, and as a result, weigh on current capital formation.
Conclusion
This paper considered the e¤ects of expiring tax provisions such as the recent Fiscal Cli¤ in the US. Empirically, a rise in economic policy uncertainty lowers employment and investment, and produces a rapid decline in equipment and a slow decline in structures investment.
In the model, an uncertainty shock pushes the economy towards a date when the tax rate may change. This uncertainty generates declines in investment, employment, and output, though investment adjustment costs mute the response of investment, similar to the empirical response of investment in structures.
The results highlight that uncertainty shocks such as the Fiscal Cli¤ episode lower economic activity. In addition, they show that expectations about future policy have important implications. When an uncertainty shock occurs, the adverse response in output, employment, and investment depends upon how long the uncertainty is expected to last and the likelihood of an adjustment in taxes. In addition, the potential for uncertainty shocks has negative e¤ects on the economy. If uncertainty shocks are viewed as being more likely, the economy will have a permanently lower level of activity even absent those shocks.
